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An area the size of a parking spot.  Nearly twenty-four hours spent 
alone, day after day.  No one calls or visits.  There are no magazines or 
books to read; there is no television to watch.  For the lucky ones, a small 
window allows a few rays of natural light to sneak in.  These are just a 
few of the conditions of solitary confinement experienced by thousands 
of prisoners in the United States.  They often do not know how long their 
sentence will last—sometimes a few days, sometimes a few years.  Some 
do not even know the reasons why they were put there in the first place.   
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the United 
States sparsely used solitary confinement, and by 1890, the Supreme 
Court was already commenting on the negative effects of the practice.1  
While this inspired a period of harsh criticism of solitary confinement 
and expansion of inmates’ access to the courts, the Supreme Court 
declined to declare the practice per	se	unconstitutional.2  The dawn of 
the “new age” of solitary confinement, defined by harsher conditions 
and more frequent use, is often tied to an incident at Illinois’ Marion 
State Penitentiary, where two inmates violently murdered two guards 
in separate instances on the same day in 1983.3  The subsequent facility-
 
 1 Brooke Shelby Biggs, Solitary	Confinement:	A	Brief	History, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 3, 
2009), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/03/solitary-confinement-brief-
natural-history/. 
	 2	 See	Ashley T. Rubin & Keramet Reiter, Continuity	in	the	Face	of	Penal	Innovation:	
Revisiting	the	History	of	American	Solitary	Confinement, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1604, 1621 
(2018). Cf.	Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 289-90 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial 
of cert.) (“In a case that presented the issue [of the constitutionality of solitary 
confinement], the judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and 
authority, to determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term 
confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt 
them.”). 
 3 Melanie Campbell, Vulnerable	and	Inadequately	Protected:	Solitary	Confinement,	
Individuals	with	Mental	Illness,	and	the	Laws	that	Fail	to	Protect, 264 HOFSTRA L. REV. 268-
69 (2016). 
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wide solitary confinement at Marion State lasted twenty-three years.4  
The “Marion Model”—characterized by “long-term, oftentimes 
indefinite, disciplinary segregation in which inmates are placed in 
virtually total isolation and severely restricted in their movements”—
has remained standard in correctional facilities for nearly three 
decades.5   
The tide of public opinion has since shifted and more advocacy for 
the complete abolition of solitary confinement exists today.6  Some 
states have responded to this shift and have begun to impose legislative 
limits and guidelines on the use of solitary confinement.7  New Jersey 
joined these states by passing the Isolated Confinement Restriction Act 
(“the Act”) in July 2019.8  Some even hail the Act as the most progressive 
piece of legislation limiting the use of solitary confinement in the 
country.9  While the Act is an important step towards meaningful 
limitations on solitary confinement in New Jersey, some of its provisions 
are seriously flawed.  Using the Act as an example, this Comment seeks 
to demonstrate how even solitary confinement legislation that imposes 
restrictions on the practice are overshadowed by exceptions that will 
ultimately result in the continued misuse of the practice.   
Part I will provide a background on solitary confinement, as well as 
the physical and psychological effects it inflicts on inmates.  Part II will 
 
 4 Sarah Childress & Michelle Mizner, “Lock	It	Down”:	How	Solitary	Started	in	the	U.S., 
PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/lock-it-
down-how-solitary-started-in-the-u-s/. 
 5 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The	 Ninth	 Circle	 of	 Hell:	 An	 Eighth	
Amendment	Analysis	of	Imposing	Prolonged	Supermax	Solitary	Confinement	on	Inmates	
with	a	Mental	Illness,	90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012). 
	 6	 See	 N.Y. CAMPAIGN FOR ALTS. TO ISOLATED CONFINEMENT, http://nycaic.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2021); TOGETHER TO END SOLITARY, 
http://www.togethertoendsolitary.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021); UNLOCK THE BOX, 
https://www.unlocktheboxcampaign.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
 7 Eli Hager & Gerald Rich, Shifting	Away	From	Solitary, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 
23, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/23/shifting-away-from-
solitary (discussing the various legislative and administrative reforms to solitary 
confinement across the states in 2014); State	 Legislation:	 Examples, NAT’L RELIGIOUS 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST TORTURE, http://www.nrcat.org/torture-in-us-prisons/join-a-state-
campaign/state-legislation-examples (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (providing examples of 
state legislation that seeks to restrict the use of solitary confinement); Anne Teigen, 
States	 That	 Limit	 or	 Prohibit	 Juvenile	 Shackling	 and	 Solitary	 Confinement, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-
and-criminal-justice/states-that-limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitary-
confinement635572628.aspx. 
 8 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-82.5 – 30:4-92.11 
(2019). 
 9 Catherine Kim, Solitary	Confinement	Isn’t	Effective.	That’s	Why	New	Jersey	Passed	
a	 Law	 to	 Restrict	 It, VOX, (July 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/7/10/20681343/solitary-confinement-new-jersey. 
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discuss the relevant provisions of the New Jersey Isolated Confinement 
Act, with a focus on the restrictions on the use of solitary confinement, 
and exceptions for its use.  Part III analyzes the argument in favor of 
abolition of solitary confinement.  By using the Act as a model, this 
section seeks to establish how legislation that carves out various 
exceptions cancel out the restrictions set, such that solitary confinement 
can continue to be overused and misused.   
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT? 
Solitary confinement is the practice used by correctional facilities 
to restrict the movement, privileges, and social interactions of 
inmates.10  Although the exact conditions vary by institution, there are 
three basic elements of solitary confinement: voluntary or involuntary 
removal from the general inmate population, placement in a locked 
room or cell, and confinement to a cell for over twenty-two hours per 
day.11  The cells are approximately eighty square feet, typically 
containing only a bunk bed, sink, and toilet.12  An inmate in solitary has 
only brief encounters with others, which can be as limited as an 
employee sliding a food tray through the door.13  Inmates eat alone and 
are granted around five hours of exercise per week, always alone and 
typically in a small cage.14  Visitation, phone, possession of personal 
property, and activity privileges are limited as well.15  Confinement can 
last anywhere from a few days to years on end.16   
Solitary confinement goes by many names, varying by state, 
jurisdiction, and even facility.  Other aliases for this practice include 
disciplinary housing, supermax, Secure/Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), 
maximum security, lockdown, administrative close supervision, room 
 
	 10	 Solitary	 Confinement	 (Isolation):	Definition, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
https://www.ncchc.org/solitary-confinement (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
 11 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE 
HOUSING	 3 (Jan. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/report-and-
recommendations-concerning-use-restrictive-housing. 
 12 MATEO GASPAROTTO, ET. AL., ACLU, SILENT INJUSTICE: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN VIRGINIA 
15 (2018). 
	 13	 Id. 
	 14	 Id. 
	 15	 Id. 
	 16	 See	Sam Roberts, Thomas	Silverstein,	Killer	and	Most	Isolated	Inmate,	Dies	at	67, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/obituaries/thomas-silverstein-dead.html 
(reporting on Thomas Silverstein, the inmate allegedly held in solitary confinement for 
the longest time in the United States. He has been in solitary for 32 years.). 
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confinement, or restricted engagement.17  Aside from “solitary 
confinement,” it is most commonly referred to as isolation or isolated 
confinement, as well as segregation or segregated confinement.  
Opposition to the practice of solitary confinement is largely based on the 
physical and psychological harms it inflicts on inmates.  The practice 
nonetheless remains widespread in correctional facilities.   
A. Physical	Effects	of	Solitary	Confinement	
While solitary confinement in and of itself may be used as 
punishment, the very nature of the isolation tends to include the loss of 
various other privileges.  This can include partial or total restrictions of 
exercise, restricted diet, as well as limited access to other activities.18  
Physically immature juveniles entering prison are uniquely vulnerable 
to inadequate exercise and nutrition and tend to experience stunted 
growth.19  Many juvenile inmates also reported experiencing weight and 
hair loss while in solitary, and some female juveniles even reported a 
cessation of menstruation.20  Some solitary confinement restriction laws 
have sought to ensure that restricted diets will not be used as an 
additional means of punishment against an inmate already held in 
solitary, but opinions regarding restrictions on exercise and other 
activities vary.21  Studies have also found solitary confinement to be as 
strong of a risk factor for mortality and morbidity as smoking, obesity, 
high blood pressure, and living a sedentary lifestyle.22   
 
 17 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 4 n.1; Brielle Basso, Solitary	Confinement	Reform	Act:	
A	Blueprint	For	Restricted	Use	of	Solitary	Confinement	of	Juveniles	Across	the	States, 48 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1603 (2018). 
 18 Basso, supra note 17, at 1604-5. 
 19 Basso,	supra	note 17, at 1604-5. 
 20 Basso, supra note 17, at 1604-5. 
	 21	 Compare Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining how 
then-Judge Kennedy wrote a unanimous opinion for the Ninth Circuit arguing that “it 
was cruel and unusual punishment for a prisoner to be confined for a period of years 
without the opportunity to go outside except for occasional court appearances, attorney 
interviews, and hospital appointments.”), and	 Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 
(10th Cir. 2017), cert.	denied, 139 S. Ct. 5, (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of 
cert.) (“[O]ur Constitution does not permit such a total deprivation [of exercise] in the 
absence of a particularly compelling interest” but admitting that the factual record and 
legal analysis of the lower courts as to the presence or absence of a compelling interest 
was insufficient), with	Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.	denied, 
139 S. Ct. 5 (2018). 
 22 Elizabeth Bennion, Banning	the	Bing:	Why	Extreme	Solitary	Confinement	Is	Cruel	
and	Far	Too	Unusual	Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 755 (2015). 
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B. Psychological	Effects	of	Solitary	Confinement	
Perhaps the greatest risk of harm resulting from solitary 
confinement is the severe psychological harm that can be inflicted.  It is 
well-documented that a period of solitary confinement can inflict 
distress on the mental health of an inmate—including those who may 
not have had a prior history of mental illness.23  Inmates subjected to 
solitary have a shockingly high likelihood of engaging in self-harm, 
suicide attempts, and suicide.24  Across correctional facilities, nearly half 
of successful suicides occur in solitary confinement units.25   
Common psychiatric symptoms reported by solitary confinement 
inmates include anxiety, depression, illusions and hallucinations, panic 
attacks, paranoia, difficulty concentrating, memory and impulse control, 
and “intrusive obsessional (and often violent) thoughts.”26  During his 
testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Human Rights, Professor Craig Haney, Ph.D., confirmed these 
symptoms—and many more, such as anger, aggression, and even rage, 
chronic insomnia and cognitive dysfunction.27  The very nature of 
solitary confinement—isolation, stressful environment, and restricted 
social interactions and activities—makes it difficult to withstand, even 
for inmates without pre-existing mental health conditions.28		The effects 
that solitary confinement has on inmates already suffering from mental 
illness and developmental disabilities are thus even more likely to 
“deepen into something more permanent and disabling.”29   
 
	 23	 See	Rosalind Dillon, Banning	Solitary	for	Prisoners	with	Mental	Illness:	The	Blurred	
Line	Between	Physical	and	Psychological	Harm, 14 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 265, 277 (Jan. 1, 
2019); Tamar Birckhead, Children	 in	 Isolation:	The	Solitary	Confinement	of	Youth, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11-15 (2015); see	also	Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208-10 
(2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (noting that the “common side effects 
of solitary confinement include anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-
mutilation, and suicidal thoughts and behaviors.”) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric	
Effects	of	Solitary	Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 325 (2006)). 
	 24	 See	 Craig Haney, Restricting	Solitary	Confinement, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 285, 
290 (2018); see	also	Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that 
in 2011, the State Correctional Institution-Cresson reported that 80% of documented 
suicides occurred in solitary confinement units). 
 25 Dillon, supra note 23, at 277. 
 26 Dillon, supra	note 23, at 274-75. 
	 27	 Reassessing	 Solitary	 Confinement:	 The	 Human	 Rights,	 Fiscal,	 and	 Public	 Safety	
Consequences:	Hearing	Before	 the	 Subcomm.	 on	 Constitution,	 Civil	Rights	 and	Human	
Rights	of	the	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20-22 (2012) (statement of Craig 
Haney, Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz). 
 28 Craig Haney, Mental	 Health	 Issues	 in	 Long‐Term	 Solitary	 and	 “Supermax”	
Confinement, 49. CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 124, 142 (Jan. 2003). 
	 29	 Id.; see	also Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 
1:08-cv-01317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974 *41 (S.D. Ind., Dec. 31, 2012) 
(“[Psychological] pain produces suffering, and a delay in treating [it] can reduce the 
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III. A LEGISLATIVE “SOLUTION:” A BACKGROUND ON NEW JERSEY’S SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT RESTRICTION ACT 
The open question of the legality of solitary confinement has 
essentially left this issue to the states, which has resulted in varying 
success.  The most recent piece of legislation is New Jersey’s Isolated 
Confinement Restriction Act, which was signed by Governor Phil 
Murphy on July 11, 2019.30  This law has since been hailed as the “most 
progressive” piece of solitary confinement restricting legislation.31  The 
passage of the Act and its accompanying praise begs the question: can 
solitary confinement even be meaningfully restricted?  This Comment 
seeks to answer that question in the negative by using the Act to 
demonstrate that even “progressive,” well-intended legislation cannot 
justify the use of solitary confinement, except in a narrow set of clearly 
defined emergencies.   
To provide background, the following sections will briefly discuss 
the relevant provisions of the Act.  Part A discusses the two types of 
restrictions placed on the use of solitary confinement in New Jersey 
correctional facilities.  Part B discusses the Act’s exceptions that 
delineate the circumstances under which a correctional facility may 
place an inmate in solitary confinement.  Part C provides an overview of 
the Act’s provisions on staff training, as well as the appeals processes 
available to inmates placed into solitary confinement.   
A. The	Act’s	Restrictions	
1. General Restrictions: When and for how long may an 
inmate be placed in solitary confinement? 
One of the most important provisions of a solitary confinement 
restriction law is the law’s definition of solitary confinement because it 
describes the conditions and maximum duration of confinement 
permitted.  The Act defines solitary confinement as the: 
confinement of an inmate in a correctional facility, pursuant 
to disciplinary, administrative, protective, investigative, 
medical, or other classification, in a cell or similarly confined 
holding or living space, alone or with other inmates, for 
 
chances of a mentally ill prisoner achieving or re-establishing an optimal level of 
functioning.”).	
 30 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, A. 314, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2019). 
 31 Kim, supra	note 9. 
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approximately [twenty] hours or more per day in a state 
correctional facility or twenty-two hours or more per day in a 
county correctional facility, with severely restricted activity, 
movement, and social interaction.32 
In addition to New Jersey’s twenty to twenty-two hour limit set in 
the definition, the Act also prohibits more than twenty consecutive days 
of solitary confinement or more than thirty days over a sixty-day 
period.33  It is worth noting, however, that when the New Jersey 
Legislature first attempted to pass a solitary confinement restriction bill 
in 2016, the proposed limit was fifteen consecutive days or twenty days 
in a sixty-day period.34  This first attempt passed in the legislature but 
was vetoed by then-Governor Chris Christie.35  Although the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture declared that any period of 
solitary confinement longer than fifteen days constituted torture, 
Colorado is the only state to institute such a limitation.36   
The Act also sets general requirements governing when an inmate 
may be placed in solitary confinement, placing the burden of proof on 
the correctional facility to show: (a) a reasonable cause for the 
placement, (b) substantial risk of harm to the inmate or others, (c) 
specific evidence as a basis for the need, and (d) that there were no 
feasible alternatives to alleviate the potential harm.37   
2. Purpose-based Restrictions: Administrative and 
Disciplinary Segregation 
There are generally two forms of solitary confinement—
disciplinary and non-disciplinary segregation.38  Disciplinary 
segregation refers to the violation of a specific rule by an inmate and a 
determinate period of placement in solitary confinement as 
 
 32 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.7 (2019). 
 33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.8(a)(9). 
	 34	 See	Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, A. 547, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2016); Stephanie 
Wykstra, The	 Case	 Against	 Solitary	 Confinement, VOX (Apr. 17, 2019) 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/4/17/18305109/solitary-confinement-
prison-criminal-justice-reform (noting that Colorado is the only state to have 
implemented the fifteen-day U.N. standard). 
 35 Kim, supra	note 9. 
 36 Wykstra, supra	note 34; UNITED NATIONS, Solitary	Confinement	Should	Be	Banned	in	
Most	 Cases,	 UN	 Expert	 Says, (Oct. 18, 2011) 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/10/392012-solitary-confinement-should-be-
banned-most-cases-un-expert-says; (noting that the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Torture, Juan E. Méndez, stated solitary confinement lasting more than fifteen days 
is torture and thus, should be prohibited). 
 37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.8(a)(1). 
 38 Samuel Fuller, Torture	as	a	Management	Practice:	The	Convention	Against	Torture	
and	Non‐Disciplinary	Solitary	Confinement, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 102, 106 (2018). 
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punishment.39  The Act contains virtually no provisions on disciplinary 
segregation aside from three conditions to placement pending 
investigation of an alleged disciplinary offense by an inmate.  First, in 
determining to place an inmate in investigative disciplinary solitary 
confinement based on the above factors, the Act requires consideration 
of the seriousness of the alleged offense.40  The Act states that examples 
of offenses that would warrant such placement include offenses 
including violence, escape, or “encouraging others to engage in 
misconduct.”41  Second, the Act requires approval from the facility 
administrator for placement in this alleged emergency situation.42  By 
having one individual responsible for this determination, it is clear 
exactly who would be accountable in the event of misuse.  To further 
limit the possibility of abuse, the Act requires review of placement 
“within 24 hours [of placement] by a supervisory employee who was not 
involved in the initial placement.”43   
Contrarily, the Act does prohibit “non-disciplinary” solitary 
confinement, which it refers to as “administrative” segregation.44  
Despite this ban on administrative segregation, as well as the reference 
to it in the Act’s definition of solitary confinement, the Act fails to 
explicitly define “administrative” or even non-disciplinary solitary 
confinement.45  Administrative segregation is typically defined as 
placement of an individual deemed by officials as a current or future risk 
to other prisoners or staff.46   
B. Non‐Disciplinary	Exceptions	
Despite the Act’s purported ban on administrative segregation, the 
Act carves out three exceptions permitting its use.  First, the Act creates 
a lockdown exception permitting the facility-wide use of solitary 
confinement in the event of an emergency.47  The facility administrator 
or shift commander makes the determination to commence a lockdown, 
as well as the determination that the mitigating circumstances no longer 
 
 39 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 4. 
 40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(a)(1). 
 41 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(a)(1). 
 42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(a)(2). 
 43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.9(b).  
 44 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.8(a)(2) (“[A]n inmate shall not be placed in isolated 
confinement for non-disciplinary reasons.”). 
 45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4:82.7. 
 46 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 1 (Aug. 2015). 
 47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1). 
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exist and such a lockdown can be lifted.48  If the lockdown lasts for more 
than twenty-four hours, the administrator must specify why it was 
necessary, and why less restrictive alternatives were “insufficient to 
accomplish the facility’s safety goals.”49  These justifications must be 
posted to the Department of Corrections website within fifteen days of 
the lockdown, and meaningful notice of these reasons must be provided 
to the Legislature.50   
Second, the Act permits a protective-custody exception: permitting 
confinement of an inmate in a cell, or similarly confined holding or living 
space, when the facility administrator determines it is necessary to 
protect the inmate or others.51  Such conditions include a real or 
perceived threat to the inmate for reasons such as gang affiliation, debts, 
involvement in or with law enforcement, sexual orientation, or gender 
identity.52  Protective custody of an inmate may be voluntary or 
involuntary.53   
Voluntary protective custody allows an inmate to give informed, 
voluntary consent to isolation “when there is reasonable cause to 
believe that confinement is necessary to prevent reasonably foreseeable 
harm.”54  The correctional facility must keep a written record of such 
requests, and in the event that the facility rejects the request, they bear 
the burden of establishing their reasons for rejection.55  The inmate 
must also be permitted to opt-out of voluntary protective custody by 
“providing informed, voluntary, written refusal of that status.”56  The 
voluntary protective-custody provision comes with three important 
qualifications to ensure against its misuse.  First, the Act requires the 
correctional facility to attempt a less restrictive form of segregation 
prior to voluntary solitary confinement, such as a transfer to the general 
population at another facility or a transfer to special purpose housing 
for similarly threatened inmates.57  Such transfers are not required, and 
consequently, the inmate will be place in solitary confinement if the 
facility determines that the security risk is so high “that transferring the 
 
 48 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1). 
 49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1). 
 50 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1). 
 51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4). 
 52 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 23; see	also,	e.g., United States v. D.W., 198 F. 
Supp. 3d 18, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[O]ften, the only means of protection available to 
vulnerable inmates is separation from the general population.”). 
 53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(a)(b). 
 54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(a). 
 55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(a). 
 56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(e). 
 57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f). 
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inmate would be insufficient to ensure the inmate’s safety.”58  Further, 
because voluntary custody entails an inmate requesting segregation—
as opposed to punitive segregation—this provision ensures that other 
restrictions be enacted against such an inmate, such as in their 
“activities, movement and social interactions,” within the bounds of the 
needed protection for the inmate or others.59  Lastly, if the facility 
attempts to remove the inmate from voluntary protective custody, the 
inmate must be provided a “timely, fair, and meaningful opportunity to 
contest the removal.”60  As for involuntary protective custody, the Act 
requires clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence of the necessity to prevent a 
reasonably foreseeable harm, as well as evidence that there were no 
feasible less restrictive alternatives.61  The Act also permits a medical 
isolation exception.62  The Act’s definition of “medical isolation” includes 
the need to “[prevent] the spread of a communicable disease” and for 
“mental health emergenc[ies].”63   
C. Appeals	Process	for	Inmates	&	Staff	Training		
Two other important factors necessary for the meaningful 
restriction of solitary confinement are rules governing the appeals 
process for inmates to contest placement, and staff training.  While the 
Isolated Confinement Restriction Act sufficiently addresses the latter, 
the provisions governing appeals are lacking.   
Correctional facilities across the country lack clear policies on how 
inmates may appeal their assignment to solitary confinement, as well as 
those policies that detail how they can work to exit solitary, such as 
favorable or unfavorable behavior.64  The sheer quantity of rules 
governing prison life alone are obstacles in and of itself for inmates.  
These rules—including those governing the appeals process for solitary 
confinement—tend to be scattered, and at times, even contradictory.65  
 
 58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f). 
 59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(c).  
 60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(d). 
 61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(b). 
 62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(3). 
 63 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7. 
 64 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH. & ASS’N OF ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMIN., TIME-IN-CELL: THE 
ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON	 i, 9 (2015) 
(“[G]etting into segregation was relatively easy, and few policies focused on how people 
got out,” nor was it “a focus of the rules.”). 
 65 Michelle Ghafar, Exiting	 Solitary	 Confinement:	 A	 Survey	 of	 State	 Correctional	
Policies, 64 UCLA L. REV. 508, 527-39 (2017) (noting that, in a ten-state survey of 
correctional facilities, varying rules governing an inmate’s ability to exit solitary 
confinement were found within Departments of Corrections’ sections on classification 
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Moreover, they tend to be vague and highly discretionary with review 
processes occurring far too infrequently; New Jersey’s Act is 
demonstrative of this.   
Section 30:4-82.8(a)(4) is the appeals provision of the Act, stating 
that an inmate must be afforded “timely, fair and meaningful 
opportunities . . . to contest the confinement” within seventy-two hours 
of placement.66  The provision claims that the inmate is entitled to 
appear and “be represented at the hearing; an independent hearing 
officer; and a written statement of reasons for the decision made at the 
hearing.”67  There is no clarification as to who may represent the inmate, 
who the independent hearing officer is, in what capacity the officer 
advocates for the inmate, who is present at the hearing, or even what 
the guidelines are for what the review committee is seeking from the 
inmate.  Further, it is worth noting that, in addition to not clarifying who 
sits on this review committee, the Act itself states that “the final decision 
to place an inmate in isolated confinement shall be made by the facility 
administrator.”68  Importantly, the Act does not require notice to be 
provided to the inmate for whom placement in solitary confinement is 
being considered.69  Moreover, after the initial hearing within the first 
seventy-two hours, a review of such placement only occurs every thirty 
days.70  The language of this provision is notably at odds with Section 
30:4-82.8(a)(9), which prohibits isolated confinement for “more than 
[twenty] consecutive days, or for more than [thirty] days during any 
[sixty]-day period.”71  Overall, it is disappointing that a progressive 
piece of legislation failed in such a way to clarify and strengthen the 
appeals process for inmates, and as a whole the Isolated Confinement 
Restriction Act does not fare better in this area compared to other 
states.72   
 
policies, appeals systems, grievance systems, personal interviews, documentation, and 
review processes). 
 66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4).  
 67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4).  
 68 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(5). 
	 69	 See,	e.g., MODEL ACT: IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY, PROTECTING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS & 
ENSURING DUE PROCESS IN IMPOSING LONG-TERM ISOLATED CONFINEMENT § 4(C)(I) (ACLU 
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 2011) (ON FILE WITH ACLU) (“The [prisoner] must receive written 
and effective notice at least 48 hours before the hearing that such placement is being 
considered, the facts upon which consideration is based, and the [prisoner’s] rights 
under this Act, and any regulations or policies promulgated under this Act;”). 
 70 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4). 
 71 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(9). 
 72 Ghafar, supra	note 65, at 529 (noting that across ten states that together house 
more than half of the prisoners in the United States, the most common form of prisoner 
involvement in the exit process was during classification review where inmates may 
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The Act also addresses the need for staff training.  Section 30:4-
82.11(b) requires the creation of procedures by the facility 
commissioner for the training of disciplinary staff and solitary 
confinement staff.73  Pursuant to the Act, this training must include 
periodic assistance from appropriate professionals, standards 
emphasizing the restrictive circumstances under which solitary 
confinement may be used, how to identify developmental disabilities, 
how to identify the symptoms of mental illness and trauma disorders, as 
well as how to safely respond to people in distress.74  The Act also states 
that such training must include information of the facility’s standards 
for solitary confinement.75  These standards “shall be limited to when an 
inmate commits an offense involving violence, escapes or attempts to 
escape, or poses a threat to institutional safety; that the maximum 
penalties for each offense shall be based on the seriousness of the 
offense; and available less restrictive interventions.”76  Considering the 
issue surrounding the traditional deference afforded to correctional 
facilities in their policies and procedures, it is particularly important for 
senior management to set the tone on their views towards the use of 
solitary confinement.  Executive Director of the Colorado Department of 
Corrections, Rick Raemisch—who was able to lower the consecutive day 
limit on solitary confinement to fifteen days—responded to those who 
asked how he changed the culture of reliance and overuse of solitary 
confinement by saying, “It’s not a question of culture. It’s a question of 
leadership.”77  By implementing clear conditions on when and how 
solitary confinement may be used and reiterating them through 
training, it follows that there are likely to be fewer incidences of abuse 
by officials.   
The Act requires the commissioner to develop procedures for these 
training opportunities by August 2020 when the Isolated Confinement 
Restriction Act goes into effect.78  Regarding mental health training, the 
ACLU recommends at least eight hours of instruction on the types and 
symptoms of mental illness for all officers and staff.79  Staff working in 
any mental health or “step-down” units must attend an additional forty-
 
“participate in hearings or interviews with prison administrators, and receive copies of 
the final placement decision”). 
 73 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b). 
 74 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(1)-(3). 
 75 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(2). 
 76 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(2). 
 77 ASS’N OF ST. CORRECTIONAL ADMIN. & YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 
2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL	68 (2018). 
 78 N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b). 
 79 MODEL ACT, supra	note 69 at § 3(a). 
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hours of initial instruction as well as twelve hours annually if they 
continue to work in that unit.80  In its recommendations for the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice noted that the Bureau 
required quarterly mental health training of restrictive housing staff as 
well as specialized suicide prevention training for “health care 
providers, lieutenants, chaplains, and correctional counselors.”81  The 
Act notably only requires “periodic” assistance from professionals on 
the use of solitary confinement, but it is unclear whether “periodic” 
assistance extends to the training on disabilities, disorders, and mental 
illness.82  Mental health training is important for screening the 
symptoms and needs of the mentally ill, especially those who often 
“cannot make their needs known to mental health staff.”83   
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY ABOLITION IS THE ONLY SOLUTION 
The common justification for solitary confinement is its use as a 
necessary last resort against dangerous and violent prisoners.84  While 
this justification stems from legitimate safety concerns by prison 
officials, there is no evidence that solitary confinement deters inmates 
from misbehaving.85  Moreover, the common perception that solitary 
confinement is only reserved for the worst of the worst is not borne out 
by the evidence, despite its apparent justifications on the grounds of 
safety.86  Empirical studies show that only a minority of the solitary 
confinement population are the result of violence or dangerousness.87  
 
 80 MODEL ACT, supra	note 69 at § 3(a). 
 81 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 57; see	also	U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 
11 at 80, 118 (noting that The National Institute of Corrections provides a 32-hour 
“Management of Restrictive Housing Populations” training program that includes 
training, technical assistance, information services, and policy development assistance 
to federal, state, and local correctional agencies). 
	 82	 See	N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:4-82.11(b)(1). 
 83 Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1550 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
 84 Anthony Gangi, Why	We	Need	Solitary	Confinement	in	Corrections, CORRECTIONS 1 
(May 31, 2016), https://www.correctionsone.com/public-perceptions/articles/why-
we-need-solitary-confinement-in-corrections-FRkqBaMQYSXFqIsw/; see	 also LIMAN 
PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 8 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“Several states . . . specified that 
the purpose of administrative segregation was not punitive, but to ensure the safety and 
security of prisoners and staff.”) [hereinafter 2014 National Survey]. 
 85 ALISON SHAMES, ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: COMMON 
MISCONCEPTIONS AND EMERGING SAFE ALTERNATIVES 20 (May 2015). 
	 86	 Id. at 12. 
	 87	 See,	e.g., id.; LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 
ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 60 (Oct. 2018) (“[W]e learned that the 
criteria for placing prisoners in isolation were broad, as was the discretion afforded 
correctional staff to place individuals”); THE N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Lawsuit:	Syracuse	
Jail	is	Harming	Children	With	Abusive	Solitary	Confinement	Conditions (Sept. 21, 2016), 
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Most placements in solitary confinement are for being perceived as 
potentially violent but without committing a violent act or breaking 
prison rules.88  Further, the prison rules violated are often minor 
infractions such as failure to obey orders, using abusive language, or 
moving during a count.89  Although the safe operation of a correctional 
facility is important, the data does not support the correlation between 
the use of solitary confinement and safety.90   
Part of what makes solitary confinement inherently problematic is 
that any justifications for its use tend to be punitive in nature, even if the 
stated reason for an inmate’s placement is characterized as non-
disciplinary.  Solitary confinement erupted when correctional facilities 
were faced with the dilemma of how to punish the punished.91  
Considering the horrifying effects that any period of solitary 
confinement may have, justification is wholesomely difficult—even as a 
means of punishment.92  Furthermore, solitary confinement is 
inefficient at achieving its purported goal of deterring inmate 
misbehavior or violence.  In fact, solitary confinement increases the 
likelihood of recidivism.93   
Using New Jersey’s Isolated Confinement Restriction Act as an 
example, this section seeks to establish a two-fold argument.  First, 
solitary confinement must be abolished as both a management tool and 
a form of punishment in correctional facilities because solitary 
confinement is a short-term solution that contributes to the problems 
that it purports to solve.  The effects solitary confinement inflicts on 
 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/lawsuit-syracuse-jail-harming-children-
abusive-solitary-confinement-conditions (reporting that one inmate was placed in 
solitary confinement for singing a Whitney Houston song in his cell). 
 88 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 12. 
 89 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 14. 
 90 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE U.S. ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 18 (Nov. 2016) (“Using data from three states (Arizona, Illinois, and 
Minnesota) and one control state (Utah), and a multiple interrupted timeseries design, 
Briggs, Sundt, and Castellano (2003) . . . . concluded that ‘the bulk of the evidence 
presented here suggests that supermax is not effective at reducing system wide levels if 
prison violence.”). 
	 91	 See	 e.g., Childress, supra note 4 (discussing the alleged origins of supermax 
prisons and the reliance on solitary confinement after two guards were violently 
murdered at Illinois’ Marion State Penitentiary in 1983). 
	 92	 See Haney, supra	note 28 at 132. 
 93 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 20 (“[T]here is no evidence that confinement in a 
supermax facility produces a deterrent effect on the individual. A recent study [also] 
found that exposure to short-term disciplinary segregation as a punishment for initial 
violence did not deter incarcerated people from committing further violence in 
prison.”); SHAMES, supra note 85, at 26 (finding that some states reported higher 
recidivism rates among supermax inmates and inmates who had been held in solitary 
confinement). 
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inmates—regardless of subjection to disciplinary or non-disciplinary 
segregation—supports this proposition.  Second, the Act and similar 
legislation nominally address the issue of solitary confinement without 
substantive changes that will effectively curb its practice. 
Even “progressive” legislation intended to broadly restrict solitary 
confinement is insufficient when it carves out various exceptions, which 
consequently lead to the overuse and misuse of the practice.94  In effect, 
the broad and arbitrary exceptions overshadow any provisions in the 
Act that would seriously curtail the use of solitary confinement.   
1. Analyzing	the	Act:	What	Works	and	What	Does	Not	
One of the simplest yet most important provisions in solitary 
confinement legislation is the operative definition because this 
definition lays the framework for what constitutes acceptable 
conditions of solitary confinement.  Moreover, a definition typically 
states the number of isolation hours that legally constitute solitary 
confinement.95  For New Jersey, the Act restricts the amount of time that 
an inmate can sit in segregation, which cannot exceed twenty days, or 
more than thirty days within a period of sixty days, making it the lowest 
time restriction set by state legislation.96  Many other jurisdictions 
define solitary confinement as segregation for twenty-two to twenty-
four hours a day.97   
 
	 94	 See Kim, supra	note 9. 
 95 S.B. 3495, State S., 2017-2018 Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 96 Kim, supra note 9. 
	 97	 See,	e.g., N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, The	Humane	Alternatives	to	Long‐Term	(“HALT”)	
Solitary	Confinement	Act, https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/humane-alternatives-
long-term-halt-solitary-confinement-act (referring to state law permitting solitary 
confinement for twenty-three hours per day) (last visited Jan. 19, 2021); THE S. POVERTY 
L. CTR, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: INHUMANE, INEFFECTIVE, AND WASTEFUL 7 (Apr. 2019) (noting 
that in Florida, solitary confinement refers to isolation for twenty-two to twenty-four 
hours per day); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUG & CRIMES,	THE UNITED NATIONS STANDARD 
MINIMUM RULES FOR TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 14 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-
reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) (defining 
solitary confinement as isolation lasting twenty-hours per day); Rick Raemisch, Why	I	
Ended	 the	Horror	 of	 Long‐Term	 Solitary	 in	 Colorado’s	 Prisons, ACLU (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/solitary-confinement/why-i-ended-
horror-long-term-solitary-colorados-prisons (referring to Colorado’s policy of solitary 
confinement placement for twenty-two hours per day); Burke Butler, et. al., A	Solitary	
Failure:	The	Waste,	Cost	and	Harm	of	Solitary	Confinement	in	Texas, THE AM. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION OF TEX. (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.aclutx.org/en/report/a-solitary-failure 
(discussing solitary confinement in Texas, which refers to isolation for twenty-two 
hours per day). 
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Despite the clarity of the general definition in the Act, it notably 
fails to define administrative or investigative segregation.98  The sheer 
inclusion of these categories in the Act causes confusion as both are 
forms of non-disciplinary segregation, which is banned by Section 30:4-
82.8(a)(2).99  Nor do any of the three exceptions include administrative 
or investigative isolation.100   
2. The	Restrictions	and	Exceptions		
The Act highlights the inherent tension between broad restrictions 
and its manifold exceptions.  Together these two essential components 
paint the picture of a good faith attempt to address the issue, the product 
of a well-meaning legislature.  But despite the praise it has received,101 
this Act only nominally addresses solitary confinement.  The Act is 
composed of dozens of little compromises that when aggregated and 
implemented will result in continued misuse of this practice.  This 
section analyzes how the quantity and content of the exceptions that 
permit the use of solitary confinement overpower the restrictions of the 
Act.   
1. The Restrictions 
The Act has been praised as “the most progressive legislative 
reform to the practice of solitary confinement in the [United States]” 
because of the restrictions. 102  The Act sets when, against whom, and for 
how long solitary may be used.   
i. Twenty-day limit 
In addition to the twenty-hour “limit” discussed above, the Act 
similarly imposes restrictions on how many days an inmate may be held 
in solitary confinement.  Section 30:4-82.8(a)(9) prohibits solitary 
confinement lasting more than twenty consecutive days or more than 
thirty days over a sixty-day period.103  The necessity of clear legislative 
restrictions on the permitted duration of confinement cannot be 
overstated.  It is a common misperception that solitary confinement is a 
brief sentence for inmates.104  While disciplinary solitary confinement is 
supposed	to last a definite period of time by definition, more often than 
 
 98 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.7 (2019). 
	 99	 See	N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.7. 
 100 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.8(a)(2). 
 101 Kim, supra	note 9. 
 102 Kim, supra	note 9.  
 103 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:4-82.8(a)(9). 
 104 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 15. 
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not, an individual remains in solitary confinement beyond that time 
period.105  Still, non-disciplinary or administrative solitary confinement 
are notoriously problematic because such confinements allow for 
indefinite sentences.106   
The Act’s duration restriction provides a good example of a 
provision that is comparatively better than other states, however still 
insufficient.  In most other states the durational limit is no more than 
thirty consecutive days.107  The United Nations has stated that any 
period of solitary confinement longer than fifteen days constitutes 
torture.108  Considering that New Jersey’s first attempt at a solitary 
confinement law in 2016, vetoed by then-Governor Chris Christie, 
passed in both houses with a fifteen-day restriction, it is disappointing 
that it was compromised for the Act.109  Furthermore, only one state, 
Colorado, has already successfully instituted the fifteen-day 
recommended restriction.110  Additionally, as the permanence and 
severity of the effects of solitary confinement become more universally 
understood—as well as how quickly they can set in—it becomes harder 
to justify the practice based on any justification, especially punishment.   
 
	 105	 Compare U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 4 (defining disciplinary solitary 
confinement as punishment that lasts for a determinate term for violation of a specific 
rule), with	SHAMES, supra note 85, at 15 (reporting that in federal prison and at least 
nineteen states, solitary confinement is permitted for an indefinite period. This report 
also noted that’s in 2009, the average solitary confinement term was over	six	years	in 
Illinois supermax prisons and nearly four years in Texas correctional facilities), and 
LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN 
NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 14 (Oct. 2018) (noting that according to an aggregate 
of data from responding jurisdictions, about one-fifth of inmates were held for fifteen 
days to one month, and almost 10% were held for more than three years).  
 106 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	 note 11, at 4 (defining administrative solitary 
confinement as punishment that lasts for an indeterminate term). 
	 107	 See,	e.g., THE S. POVERTY L. CTR,	supra	note 97, at 8 (discussing Florida’s policy that 
disciplinary solitary confinement is permitted for between thirty and sixty days, and no 
more than ninety); Dan M. Clark, NY	Proposes	New	Curbs	on	Use	of	Solitary	Confinement	
in	 State	 Prisons,	 Local	 Jails, N.Y. L. J. (Aug. 28, 2019). 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/28/ny-proposes-new-curbs-on-
use-of-solitary-confinement-in-state-prisons-local-jails/ (reporting on the new rules 
proposed by lawmakers to phase in a 30-day cap on solitary confinement over the next 
three years); KATIE ROSE QUANDT, ET AL., SOLITARY WATCH, LOUISIANA ON LOCKDOWN: A REPORT 
ON THE USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN LOUISIANA STATE PRISONS, WITH TESTIMONY FROM THE 
PEOPLE WHO LIVE IT ,70 (June 2019) (noting that Louisiana Department of Corrections’ 
solitary confinement policy is a review every ninety days). 
 108 UNITED NATIONS, supra	note 36. 
 109 Kim, supra	note 9. 
 110 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-
LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL	67 (Oct. 2018).  
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ii. Ban on Non-Disciplinary Solitary Confinement 
Notably, the Act also stands out because of its ban of solitary 
confinement for non-disciplinary reasons, though subject to some 
exceptions.111  Non-disciplinary solitary confinement tends to be 
synonymous with “administrative segregation,” which is typically used 
when an inmate is perceived as a current or future threat to others.112  
This form of solitary confinement is problematic for two primary 
reasons.  First, administrative segregation often entails confinement for 
an unspecified time period.113  For the 2015 Yale Law School report on 
administrative segregation, thirty-two out of forty-four responding 
jurisdictions self-reported that their correctional facilities had no 
minimum time period for administrative segregation.114  Notably, forty-
two out of the same forty-four jurisdictions also reported no maximum 
confinement period.115  The Isolated Confinement Restriction Act is 
commendable for enacting a twenty-consecutive-day limit, compared to 
many states’ thirty-day limit.116   
Second, administrative segregation tends to be a “catch-all” 
category for the justification of placement of inmates in solitary 
confinement; the criteria for placement and discretion wielded by those 
in charge of the placement tends to be broad.117  Further, because 
 
 111 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30.4-82.8(a)(2) (2019). 
 112 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 1 (Aug. 2015); see	also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	
note 11, at 4. 
	 113	 See	McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that a plaintiff 
inmate had a right to due process because he was held in administrative segregation for 
four years in violation of the prison’s own rules requiring “specific reasons why 
administrative segregation is warranted.”); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 4.	
 114 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 10, 27, n.96, n.97 (Aug. 2015) (The forty-six 
responding jurisdictions included forty-four states, the District of Colombia and Federal 
Bureau of Prisons. The six states that did not respond were California, Idaho, Maine, 
Maryland, New Mexico, and Vermont). 
	 115	 Id.	at 27. 
	 116	 See	 UNITED NATIONS, supra	 note 36 (noting that the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Juan E. Méndez, stated solitary confinement lasting more than 
15 days is torture and thus, should be prohibited); THE S. POVERTY L. CTR.,	supra	note 97, 
at 8 (finding that in Florida, punitive solitary confinement typically lasted between 30 
to 60 days, and administrative confinement has a maximum limit of 90 days, which is 
notably not always followed); Clark, supra	 note 107 (reporting on the new rules 
proposed by lawmakers to phase in a 30-day cap on solitary confinement over the next 
three years); VIRGINIA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS OPERATING PROCEDURE, Offender Discipline, 
Institutions No. 861.1, § 6(A)(5), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/files/operating-
procedures/800/vadoc-op-861-1.pdf (permitting solitary confinement for a maximum 
of 30 days). 
 117 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 8 (Aug. 2015). 
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administrative segregation tends to occur if there is a perceived threat, 
often inmates who act out tend to fall under the umbrella of 
administrative segregation.118  Many “misbehaving” inmates are acting 
under the duress of a mental illness, or symptoms of it.119  As such, 
placement in solitary is hardly a solution.120  In addition to this 
definition, the Act also states five classifications of segregation of 
inmates from general population: emergency confinement, isolated 
confinement, less restrictive intervention, medical isolation, and 
protective custody.121  While the Act’s non-disciplinary solitary 
confinement ban can be considered one of its achievements, the next 
section will explain how it will be undermined in application of the 
various exceptions.   
2. The Exceptions 
As discussed in Section I(B)(3), the Act contains three exceptions 
to the prohibition of non-disciplinary solitary confinement: the 
lockdown exception, protective custody exception, and medical 
emergency exception.122  Each exception explains in varying detail the 
circumstances under which correctional facilities may place an inmate 
 
	 118	 See	Maureen L. O’Keefe et al.,	One	Year	Longitudinal	Study	of	 the	Psychological	
Effects	of	Administrative	Segregation,	CO DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, 82 (2010),	available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232973.pdf (“It is impossible to ignore the 
extremely disproportionate rate at which inmates with serious mental illness are 
assigned to [administrative segregation].”); David Lovell, Patterns	of	Disturbed	Behavior	
in	a	Supermax	Population, 35(8) CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV., 985, 990 (2008) (“Serious mental 
illness can safely be attributed to at least 25% of supermax prisoners in this study” of 
122 inmates across 3 Supermax prisons in Washington’s prison system at the time); see	
also Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1121 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (“Defendants’ 
screening process is not a reasonable safeguard against housing seriously mentally ill 
inmates at Supermax because it is not designed to keep seriously mentally ill inmates 
out of Supermax.”), Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d	on	
other	grounds, 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999) (“ Furthermore, plaintiffs submitted credible 
evidence of a pattern in TDCJ of housing mentally ill inmates in administrative 
segregation—inmates who, to be treated, would have to be removed to inpatient care.”). 
	 119	 See	Ashley Halvorsen, Solitary	Confinement	of	Mentally	 Ill	Prisoners:	A	National	
Overview	 &	 How	 the	 ADA	 Can	 Be	 Leveraged	 to	 Encourage	 Best	 Practices, 27 S. CAL. 
INTERDIS. L.J., 205, 206 (2017) (“[N]ot only are the mentally ill more likely to be placed in 
solitary confinement, they often find it exceedingly difficult to meet the requirements to 
be released back into the general prison population.”); Rebecca Wallace,	Out	of	Sight,	Out	
of	 Mind:	 Colorado’s	 Continued	 Warehousing	 of	 Mentally	 Ill	 Prisoners	 in	 Solitary	
Confinement, ACLU COLO. (2013), http://aclu-co.org/wp-
content/uploads/files/imce/Solitary%20Report.pdf (discussing the Colorado 
Department of Corrections practice.of “continued warehousing of mentally ill prisoners 
in solitary confinement”). 
 120 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 90 at 11. 
 121 Isolated Confinement Restriction Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7 (2019). 
 122 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d). 
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in solitary confinement for reasons other than violation of a rule.123  The 
sections below will analyze each exception and discuss which 
components are necessary for the safe operation of correctional 
facilities, and which are inherently problematic primarily because they 
tend to be punitively misused.   
i. Lockdown Exception 
First, the Act permits a lockdown exception if it is determined that 
one is necessary to ensure the safety of the inmates until the 
circumstances no longer exist.124  Ideally, facility-wide lockdowns 
should be the only permitted instance of solitary confinement; the 
circumstances that trigger this are limited instances where the danger 
to inmates and prison officials are serious.125  Unlike administrative 
solitary confinement where the justification for placement is based on 
some perceived future threat, lockdown only occurs in response to 
events.126  Moreover, the Act protects against possible misuse with 
reporting requirements.127   
ii. Protective Custody 
The Act also permits a protective custody exception, which allows 
the isolation of an inmate either at the discretion of a facility 
administrator or at the request of the inmate.128  Protective custody can 
be a useful tool to remove a vulnerable inmate from the general 
population based on perceived threats, often due to immutable 
 
 123 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d). 
 124 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1). 
	 125	 See,	e.g., Childress, supra	note 4; Marisa Iati, Five	Mississippi	Inmates	were	Killed	in	
a	 Week,	 Officials	 Say.	 Then	 Two	 Went	 Missing, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/01/03/mississippi-prisons-
lockdown-after-five-inmates-killed-week/ (discussing an incident at Parchman in 
which five prisoners were killed and several were injured, resulting in a lockdown); 
Suzanne Moore, “Large‐Scale	 Fights”	 Leads	 to	 Lockdown	 at	 NY	 Facility	Where	 Two	
Escaped, CORRECTIONSONE (Aug. 30, 2015), https://www.correctionsone.com/riots-and-
crowd-control/articles/large-scale-fights-leads-to-lockdown-at-ny-facility-where-2-
escaped-HZj5g8Ua4gOwPPQE/ (reporting on two large-scale, violent fights that 
occurred at Clinton Correctional Facility, resulting in lockdown).  
 126 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE LIMAN-ASCA 2014 SURVEY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 8 (Aug. 2015). 
 127 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(1) (requiring that if the lockdown lasted for more 
than twenty-four hours, the prison official documents the specific reasons for its 
necessity and why alternatives were insufficient. These reasons must also be published 
on the Department of Corrections website within fifteen days of the lockdown, and 
meaningful notice of the reasons must be provided to the Legislature). 
 128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7 (defining protective custody as the “confinement of an 
inmate in a cell or similar confined holding or living space, under conditions necessary 
to protect the inmate or others.”). 
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characteristics such as disabilities or sexual orientation.129  As discussed 
in Section III(B) above, the Act sets fairly clear guidelines to regulate this 
exception—particularly in instances of involuntary protective 
custody.130  There are, however, issues with this exception.   
First, the Act asserts that protective custody inmates must receive 
similar privileges, such as activities, movement, and social contact, as 
inmates in general population.131  Whether this is likely to occur or is 
even feasible, however, is questionable.  And if it does become common 
practice in New Jersey correctional facilities, it is unlikely that the 
privileges permitted for protective custody inmates will be similar to 
those permitted for general population.132  Further, the privileges 
provision of the protective custody exception is at odds with another 
provision.  Section 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f) requires that before the facility 
use protective custody, the facility must attempt a less restrictive 
intervention, including transfer “to a special-purpose housing unit for 
inmates who face similar threats.”133  At least one other state has already 
successfully implemented such a specialized unit that is separate from 
both general population and solitary confinement housing.134  If such a 
special-purpose housing is available in facilities in the state, why are 
they not the default placement for inmates in need of protection?   
Further, this exception also stands at odds with the Act’s 
prohibition on the use of solitary confinement against vulnerable 
populations.135  Despite the different name, protective custody is 
solitary confinement, nonetheless.  This exception effectively overrides 
the prohibition on solitary confinement of members of a vulnerable 
population, so long as the correctional places the inmates in solitary 
confinement under the euphemism of protective custody.   
While the restrictions set on the protective custody exception 
appear beneficial, they nonetheless highlight how solitary confinement 
by any name cannot be divorced from its punitive roots.  Protective 
custody is not the only or most effective solution to this common 
 
 129 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 4; see	also United States v. D.W., 198 F. Supp. 
3d 18, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[O]ften, the only means of protection available to vulnerable 
inmates is separation from the general population.”).	
 130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(b). 
 131 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(c). 
	 132	 See	QUANDT, supra note 107, at 93. 
 133 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(d)(4)(f). 
 134 SHAMES, supra note 85, at 22 (reporting on Washington’s “Skill Building Unit,” 
which houses and provides out-of-cell programming for intellectually and 
developmentally disabled inmates). 
 135 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection d. of 
this section, an inmate who is a member of a vulnerable population shall not be placed 
in isolated confinement.”). 
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predicament for correctional facilities.136  It is counterproductive at 
best, and harmful at worst, to hold the most vulnerable inmates in the 
same restrictive conditions as violent, misbehaving inmates.137   
iii. The Medical Isolation Exception 
The Act permits medical isolation to “prevent[] the spread of a 
communicable disease,” as well as “mental health emergenc[ies].”138  
Like the lockdown exception, the first portion of the medical isolation 
exception—using solitary confinement as a means to quarantine an 
infectious inmate—is an understandably necessary and acceptable 
circumstance that requires such an extreme response.  
Notwithstanding, the latter half of the exception is one of the most 
problematic exceptions of the Act.   
It is a dangerous misperception that isolating an inmate who is 
experiencing a mental health emergency in solitary confinement 
conditions is the only solution.  Nor is it an appropriate response.139  The 
consequences of relying on solitary confinement as a tool for managing 
and treating the mentally ill are far-reaching.  There are three pertinent 
issues with correctional facilities’ overreliance on solitary confinement 
of the mentally ill.  First, it is well-documented that the psychological 
implications of solitary confinement are so severe that it engenders 
symptoms of mental illness in any prison.140  It follows that inmates 
suffering from pre-existing mental health issues experience 
exacerbation of their symptoms, as well as complications with re-
establishing social functionality.141  One researcher even concluded that 
“there is not a single published study of solitary or supermax-like 
confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting for longer than 
 
	 136	 See	SHAMES, supra note 85, at 22. 
	 137	 See	SHAMES, supra note 85, at 28. 
 138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7. 
	 139	 See SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS 
AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 34 (2003) (arguing that the manner with which 
prison staff treats inmates who are suffering from a mental illness episode is 
inappropriate and can aggravate the issue). 
	 140	 See	Dillon, supra	note 23, at 275; see	also	Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric	Effects	of	
Solitary	Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. POL’Y 325, 333 (2006) (“I have observed that, for 
many of the inmates so housed, incarceration in solitary caused . . . the appearance of 
acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness.”). 
	 141	 See	Bennion, supra	note 23, at 743 (“Prisoners entering solitary confinement with 
mental-health issues often find those issues severely exacerbated.”); Haney, supra	note 
28, at 142 (“[P]risoners with preexisting mental illnesses are at greater risk of having 
this suffering deepen	into	something	more	permanent	and	disabling.”) (emphasis added).	 
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10 days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at 
will, that failed to result in negative psychological effects.”142   
Second, there are simply far too many inmates in our correctional 
facilities suffering from mental illnesses, such that relying on solitary 
confinement is impractical and even worsens the problems it seeks to 
resolve.143  As of 2015, there were ten times more people with mental 
illnesses in correctional facilities than mental health treatment 
facilities.144  Other estimates have claimed that as much as a third of the 
country’s prison population suffers from mental health issues.145  
Between 2017 and 2018, data self-reported by thirty-three states 
showed that a median of 7.9% of the male custodial population was in 
restrictive housing and suffering from serious mental illness.146  Three 
states reported less than 1%, and two reported 0% of their male 
custodial population as having a serious mental illness and being held 
in restrictive housing.147  But, thirteen states reported double digits, and 
New Mexico reported that 63.9% of their seriously mentally ill male 
custodial population was in restrictive housing.148   
The third issue with using solitary confinement as a tool for 
managing the mentally ill is that symptoms may drive the “disruptive 
behavior” that lands them in solitary.149  These inmates, as a result of 
 
 142 Haney, supra	note 28, at 132. 
	 143	 See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-
cv-01317, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974, at *41 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (“[Psychological] 
pain produces suffering, and a delay in treating the condition complicates the condition, 
can accelerate or intensify decompensation and can reduce the chances of a mentally ill 
prisoner achieving or re-establishing an optimal level of functioning.”);	 Joyce Kosak, 
Mental	Health	Treatment	and	Mistreatment	in	Prisons, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 397–
98 (2005) (noting that when adequate mental health treatment is provided to prisons, 
there is a notable improvement in safety as evidenced by a reduction in the number of 
violent disciplinary infractions, which are typically disproportionately high for inmates 
with a mental illness as a result of inadequate treatment). 
 144 Darrell Steinberg & David Mills, When	 Did	 Prisons	 Become	 Acceptable	Mental	




 145 LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-
LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL	 46 (Oct. 2018) (citing JENNIFER BRONSON & 
MARCUS BERZOFKSY, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY 
PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–12, NCJ 250612 (June 2017), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf). 
	 146	 Id. at 48.  
	 147	 Id. 
	 148	 Id. 
 149 Ghafar, supra note 65, at 544 (discussing how “step-down” prison programs that 
allow inmates to exit solitary confinement by incentivizing “good behavior” is 
troublesome for mentally ill inmates because “[i]n a circular fashion, the extreme social 
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their psychological conditions, often have difficulty conforming to the 
hyper-regulated environment of prison.150  As a result, prison staff often 
“treat disordered behaviors as disorderly behavior.”151  One of the most 
salient examples of this was an inmate in Tamms Correctional Center, 
Illinois, who received a sentence of one year in solitary confinement 
after cutting his arm open with glass and eating his flesh.152  In cases 
such as this, an inmate’s symptoms or claims of mental illness may be 
portrayed as manipulation or malingering.153  This is a blatant and 
disturbing mischaracterization, as such behavior is often consistent 
with symptoms of mental illness, and many cases demonstrate inmates 
“inflicting self-harm to escape their cell, even if just for a trip to 
medical.”154  The cases are gruesome, including incidents such as an 
inmate attempting to relieve an anxiety attack by stabbing paper clips 
into his abdomen, and another “remov[ing] a screw from his light switch 
cover and insert[ing] it into his penis just to get out of his cell.”155  
Solitary confinement being the default solution for misbehavior (which 
symptoms of untreated illness often cause) can perpetuate a destructive 
cycle: disruptive behavior resulting from a mental illness placing an 
inmate in solitary, which in turn has a dangerously high likelihood of 
exacerbating the issue.156   
 
and sensory deprivation of segregation in turn exacerbates those same symptoms that 
have kept these inmates stuck at the bottom due to repeated disciplinary infractions.”). 
 150 Ghafar, supra note 65, at 545 n.156. 
	 151	 Developments	in	the	Law:	The	Law	of	Mental	Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (2008). 
 152 ABRAMSKY, supra	note 139, at 174 (“Inmate appeared before the committee to 
address the charges. Inmate stated: I’m guilty. I was hungry and I was eating my arm 
that day. . . . Disciplinary action: Segregation one year.”). 
	 153	 Compare	 Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, Illinois	Prisoner	Says	Years	of	Solitary	
Confinement	 Caused	 Mental	 Illness,	 Self‐Mutilation, SOLITARY WATCH (Sept. 2, 2011), 
https://solitarywatch.org/2011/09/02/illinois-inmate-claims-years-of-solitary-
confinement-have-led-to-mental-illness-and-self-mutilation/ (claiming that Anthony 
Gay’s seven-year isolation included routine self-mutilation, including an incident in 
which he cut off one of his testicles and hung it from a string on his cell door), with People 
v. Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 (affirming trial court dismissal of defendant’s 
amended postconviction petition and rejected defendant’s argument that “an offender 
whose mental illness falls short of criminal insanity is less culpable than other offenders 
generally.”). 
 154 Dillon, supra note 23, at 278. 
 155 ABRAMSKY, supra	note 139, at 145; Christine Rebman, The	Eighth	Amendment	and	
Solitary	Confinement:	The	Gap	in	Protection	From	Psychological	Consequences, 49 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 567, 573-74 (1999) (citing Memorandum	 Compiling	 Inmate	 Letters	 from	 the	
MacArthur	Justice	Center	and	the	Institute	for	Community	Law	to	the	Coalition	of	Lawyers	
and	Members	of	Public	Interest	Community	Concerned	About	Tamms	Correctional	Center, 
3-5 (July 13, 1998) (on file with author)). 
	 156	 See ABRAMSKY, supra	note 139, at 62 (“For the person with mental illness who 
accumulates misconduct reports, ‘the pattern of custodial routine is an original demand 
for compliance, and subsequent deprivation and punishment reinforce the original 
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The governing standards for both placement into solitary 
confinement and removal therefrom are often arbitrary and 
discretionary.157  Navigating the rules of prison life is difficult for all 
inmates, let alone those with mental illness, because it is rarely clear 
what the expectations for inmate behavior actually are.158  Such 
ambiguity, coupled with insufficient training of prison staff to recognize 
and treat inmates with mental illness, has led to a disproportionate 
amount of mentally ill inmates in solitary.159   
3. No Available Alternatives: Why Other Avenues of Reform 
Are Insufficient 
The argument for abolition is strengthened by the lack of available 
alternatives to pursue reform of solitary confinement.   
i. Judicial Reform 
Lawsuits against prison officials and administrations have become 
a common avenue of redress from solitary confinement.  The Supreme 
Court has heard solitary confinement cases over the years, extending 
significant legal protections to prisoners and expressing its concerns 
about the effects of solitary confinement.160  The Court first 
acknowledged some of the horrors of solitary confinement in In	 re	
Medley161	and reasoned that it was an “additional punishment” to an 
 
demand, which intensifies the problems by imposing more pressures upon already 
existing pressures without	providing	any	solution	to	the	original	problem.’”) (emphasis 
added). 
	 157	 See	 Ghafar, supra	 note 65, at 512 (discussing how scholarship on solitary 
confinement often focuses on “mental health consequences and the arbitrary reasons 
and inconsistent processes determining how prisoners are sentenced to this 
confinement”); Mariam Hinds & John Butler, Solitary	 Confinement:	 Can	 Courts	 Get	
Inmates	Out	of	the	Hole? 11 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 331, 363 (June 2015) (discussing a mental 
health and substance abuse task force that was sent to assess the Maine Department of 
Corrections “[e]xpress[ed] concern with ‘the amount of discretion exercised by 
corrections officers in sending prisoners to’ solitary confinement”). 
	 158	 See Ghafar, supra	note 65, at 530 (finding that such arbitrary standards were used 
by a majority of the ten states’ Departments of Corrections, including Georgia, Michigan, 
Arizona, and Ohio). 
 159 Hafemeister & George, supra note 5, at 46. 
 160 Daniel H. Goldman & Ryan Brimmer, U.S.	Supreme	Court	Cases, SOLITARY WATCH, 
https://solitarywatch.org/resources/u-s-supreme-court-cases/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
2020). 
 161 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168, 171 (1890) (“A considerable number of the 
prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition . . . and 
others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those who stood 
the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover 
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”) (“[T]he 
solitary confinement to which the prisoner was subjected by the statute of Colorado of 
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inmate’s sentence, amounting to an unconstitutional ex post facto 
punishment.  Thus, as early as 1890, this country’s judicial system 
assessed the legality and harms of solitary confinement.  Members of the 
Court have continued to echo the concerns stated in In	 re	 Medley 
regarding solitary confinement’s legality in light of its harmful effects.162  
Yet, almost inexplicably, the Court has declined to declare the practice 
per	 se	 unconstitutional, and has also denied certiorari for several 
contemporary solitary confinement cases.163  	
ii. Administrative Reform 
Another more common, but ineffective, avenue used to address 
solitary confinement has been “administrative” changes, such as minor 
reforms and policy changes made by the state legislature or by their 
Department of Corrections.  Such changes suggest that this country is 
moving in the right direction and that the severe, inhumane effects of 
solitary confinement are becoming more widely condemned.  But, while 
these are important policies, they are largely insufficient.  In essence, 
administrative changes tend to act as an attempt to merely put a band-
aid on the issue.   
Administrative reforms to solitary confinement swept the country 
in 2014, dubbing it “the biggest year for reform.”164  These reforms 
ranged from mere recommendations to pledges by Departments of 
Corrections to reduce the use of solitary confinement to a complete ban 
on the use of solitary for certain groups.165  While these reforms are 
beneficial and, again, suggest that the reliance on solitary confinement 
is on the decline, they have not generated lasting results in most states.  
New York is one of the most illustrative examples.  As one of the states 
that notably ended juvenile solitary confinement, New York soon 
 
1889 . . . was an additional punishment of the most important and painful character, and 
is, therefore, forbidden	by	this	provision	of	the	Constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
	 162	 See	e.g., Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.	denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 5, 10 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (“Courts and corrections 
officials must accordingly remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by 
keeping [petitioners] in ‘near-total isolation’ from the living world, in what comes 
perilously close to a penal tomb.”) (internal citations omitted). 
	 163	 See Apodaca, 139 S. Ct. at 10; Ruiz v. Texas, cert.	denied, 137 S. Ct. 1246 (2017); 
Smith v. Ryan, 823 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.	denied 137 S. Ct. 1283 (2017); Ayala 
v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 2014); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015), 
rehearing	denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 (2015). 
 164 Hager, supra note 7. 
 165 Hager, supra note 7 (noting that a Nebraska legislative commission made sixteen 
recommendations to the state Corrections Department); Hager, supra note 7 (reporting 
that the New Mexico Corrections Department committed to reducing its reliance on 
solitary confinement); Hager, supra note 7 (finding that as of February 19, 2014, New 
York banned juvenile solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons). 
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heeded advocacy for further restrictions.166  The Humane Alternatives 
to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (“HALT”) was introduced to the 
New York Legislature on January 15, 2019, and contained sweeping 
reforms to solitary confinement, such as suicide prevention and other 
mental health screening and removal provisions.167  Additionally, it 
defined solitary confinement as any segregation for more than 
seventeen hours—the lowest limit proposed by a state legislature yet.168  
Over the next few months, it appeared that there was enough support 
for passage in both houses of the state legislature.169  By mid-June, 
however, the bill fell short of enactment.170  Despite this failure to pass 
the bill, Governor Cuomo and other lawmakers insisted that the 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) 
enact administrative policies.171  The new rules included bans on 
solitary confinement against populations such as pregnant women and 
inmates with mental or physical disabilities, as well as new training 
requirements and prohibitions against punitive diet restrictions.172  
Perhaps most notably, the DOCCS rules will begin to phase in a thirty-
day limit on the use of solitary confinement over the next three years; a 
ninety-day cap will be effective in October 2021 and a sixty-day cap by 
April 2022, until the thirty-day cap goes into effect on October 1, 
2022.173   
Since the passage of these rules, reports claim that they (including 
the ban on juvenile solitary confinement) quickly fell to the wayside in 
correctional facilities across the state.174  Correctional facilities in New 
York have banned and restricted “solitary confinement” in name only, 
and instead now utilize two common replacements: “keeplock 
 
 166 N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra	note 97. 
 167 The Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (“HALT”), S.B. 
1623, 2019-2020 N.Y. Legislative Sess. (2019) 
	 168	 Id. 
 169 Dennis Slattery, Breaking:	HALT	Bill	Ending	Solitary	Confinement	Gains	Enough	
Support	 to	 Pass	NYS	 Senate, N.Y. ASSOC. OF PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. SERV., (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nyaprs.org/e-news-bulletins/2019/3/22/breaking-halt-bill-ending-
solitary-confinement-gains-enough-support-to-pass-nys-senate. 
 170 Clark, supra	note 107. 
 171 Clark, supra	note 107. 
 172 Clark, supra	note 107. 
 173 Clark, supra	note 107. 
	 174	 See	Jake Offenhartz, “Separation	Status”	Now	Replacing	Solitary	Confinement	For	
Teens	 on	 Rikers,	 Attorneys	 Say, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 23, 2019), 
https://gothamist.com/news/separation-status-now-replacing-solitary-confinement-
for-teens-on-rikers-attorneys-say; Andrea Cipriano, Solitary	Confinement	 Increases	 in	
New	 York	 State:	 Report, CRIME REPORT (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://thecrimereport.org/2019/10/29/solitary-confinement-increases-in-new-
york-state-report/.  
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sanctions” and “separation housing status.”175  Inmate transfers to local 
and county jails that do not restrict solitary confinement use is another 
reported workaround to the restrictions.176   
Other states have followed similar trajectories as New York.  After 
a 2011 Washington	 Post report found Virginia prisons held one in 
twenty prisoners in solitary confinement—including 500 of the 750 
prisoners at Supermax Red Onion State Prison—the Virginia 
Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) implemented the “Segregation 
Reduction Step-Down Plan.”177  The 2016 Department of Justice 
Restrictive Housing report included VDOC’s efforts as an example for 
how to provide “a path for inmates in long-term administrative 
segregation to work their way into the general population.”178  While the 
Step-Down Plan created some improvements in Virginia correctional 
facilities, there remains serious concern both about the long-term 
effectiveness of the Plan and the lack of additional reform since 2011.179  
Most notably, reports explain that despite the Step-Down Plan’s thirty-
day limit on disciplinary solitary confinement, inmates still face 
indefinite periods of isolation.180  Further, inmates continue to report 
horrifying instances of abuse and mistreatment by correctional 
employees.181   
 
 175 Offenhartz, supra	note 174 (noting that “separation housing status” is particularly 
troublesome because there are no apparent placement restrictions based on inmates 
age, mental health, or medical status, nor is there a definitive end period). See	 also 
Cipriano, supra	note 174 (discussing New York’s “keeplock sanctions”). 
	 176	 See	Ashley Southall & Jan Ransom, New	York	City’s	Young	 Inmates	Are	Held	 in	
Isolation	 Upstate,	 Despite	 Ban, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/nyregion/inmate-solitary-young-nyc.html 
(noting that transfers of inmates under the age of 21 sharply increased starting in 2015, 
the year after the juvenile ban was effected); Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, Rikers	Doesn’t	
Put	 Teens	 in	 Solitary.	 Other	 New	 York	 Jails	 Do., MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/28/rikers-doesn-t-put-teens-in-
solitary-other-new-york-jails-do. 
 177 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 24-25. 
 178 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra	note 11, at 77. 
 179 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 29. 
 180 GASPAROTTO, supra note 12, at 32. 
 181 Editorial, Horrifying	Reports	From	Solitary	Confinement	Prove	Virginia	Still	Has	Far	
to	 Go, WASH. POST. (June 3, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/horrifying-reports-from-solitary-
confinement-prove-virginia-still-has-far-to-go/2018/06/03/c7da6df0-6532-11e8-
99d2-0d678ec08c2f_story.html (“[Reports suggest] that the spirit of reform has not 
permeated the state’s Department of Corrections . . . One [solitary inmate] ‘stated that 
he has not had recreation or a shower in more than a month.’ Another ‘reported that his 
food tray slot was opened and he was sprayed in his face with a can of mace’ . . . The 
prisoner was told if he reported the incident they would ‘beat my ***** ass.’”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The ills of solitary confinement are widely known, and research 
confirms the use of solitary confinement comes with severe 
consequences to its victims.  Yet almost inexplicably, correctional 
facilities across the country continue to rely on solitary confinement.  
Moreover, the judicial system demonstrates an open unwillingness to 
address the per	se constitutionality of the practice, and Departments of 
Corrections around the country demonstrate how solitary confinement 
can be abused.182  Perhaps more distressing is the failure of state 
legislatures to abolish solitary confinement.  Instead, states pass 
piecemeal laws that merely tinker with the practice and application 
within correctional facilities: New Jersey’s Isolated Confinement 
Restriction Act provides the perfect example.  Aside from emergency 
situations, such as a facility-wide lockdown or a quarantine situation, 
facilities should not use solitary confinement as either a punishment or 
a management tool.  The toll solitary confinement exacts on inmates is 
far too great to justify its continued use.   
 
 
	 182	 See ASS’N OF ST. CORR. ADM’RS & LIMAN PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE 
HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL	68 (Oct. 2018). 
